Prohibition, Stare Decisis, and the Lagging Ability of Science to Influence Criminal Procedure by Oliver, Wesley M.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 105 | Issue 4 Article 7
Fall 2015
Prohibition, Stare Decisis, and the Lagging Ability
of Science to Influence Criminal Procedure
Wesley M. Oliver
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminology Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Wesley M. Oliver, Prohibition, Stare Decisis, and the Lagging Ability of Science to Influence Criminal Procedure, 105 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology (2015).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol105/iss4/7
7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER 11/29/2016 2:12 PM 
0091-4169/15/10504-0993 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 105, No. 4 
Copyright © 2016 by Wesley M. Oliver Printed in U.S.A. 
993 
PROHIBITION, STARE DECISIS, AND THE 
LAGGING ABILITY OF SCIENCE TO 
INFLUENCE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
WESLEY M. OLIVER* 
Science has revealed that, contrary to longstanding intuitions, 
eyewitnesses are sometimes mistaken and false confessions do occur.  The 
methods police use to obtain identifications and confessions can affect their 
reliability.  Yet criminal procedure does not deter investigatory methods that 
produce unreliable evidence as thoroughly as it does those methods that 
produce reliable evidence.  If an officer conducts an illegal search of a car 
trunk, the evidence is excluded and subsequently officers know that they must 
follow the rules if they hope to admit the fruits of such searches. If, however, 
an officer creates a suggestive lineup—which risks a false conviction—the 
identification from this lineup is not necessarily excluded.  Interrogation 
methods that risk unreliable confessions are not even a concern for the rules 
of criminal procedure unless the suspect’s will is overborn, or the suspect 
has not agreed to be interrogated.  The explanation for this state of affairs 
appears to be historical.  Our rules of criminal procedure largely derive from 
the era of Prohibition, when searches for reliable evidence were society’s 
primary concern.  Now that wrongful conviction is at least as great a concern 
as unreasonable searches, the law should acknowledge the need to deter 
police practices that risk the collection of unreliable evidence. 
  
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Scholarship, Duquesne 
University; B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Investigatory constitutional criminal procedure is, in many ways, 
backwards. Police are more effectively deterred from minimally intrusive 
misconduct that produces reliable evidence than they are from engaging in 
misconduct that threatens wrongful convictions. Physical evidence obtained 
in an unlawful seizure is excluded merely because of the means of the 
seizure,1 while efforts by police to contaminate confessions or eyewitness 
identifications yield the exclusionary sanction only if courts find that police 
misconduct produced unreliable evidence. 2  Police are thus given greater 
latitude under our constitutional scheme to manufacture false evidence than 
to discover legitimate evidence.  
This anomaly can only be explained by the historical context of modern 
constitutional criminal procedure. While the current scheme of police 
regulation has roots in jurisprudence prior to the Prohibition Era, from 1920 
to 1933, it was the rampant excesses during Prohibition that led states to 
adopt draconian rules excluding reliable physical evidence3 and prompted 
 
1 See Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation 
Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 391 (2010) (describing the 
justification of the rule throughout its history).  
2 Unreliable confessions are excluded, if at all, only under evidentiary rules that very 
liberally admit evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (stating the 
admissibility of a potentially unreliable statement “is a matter to be governed by the 
evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and 
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486 (2006) (describing 
the exclusion of unreliable confessions as a “largely forgotten purpose of the rules” regulating 
interrogations).  Intentional efforts by police officers to produce suggestive lineups do not 
necessarily invalidate the resulting identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 93, 
111–13 (1977) (rejecting per se exclusion of suggestive lineups). 
3 See Francis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 
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widespread concerns about police practices, notably interrogation practices.4 
Third-degree tactics came into disrepute in the 1920s even when they 
produced reliable confessions.5 Inaccurate eyewitness identifications were 
hardly contemplated, but reckless and destructive alcohol searches and third-
degree tactics made front-page news. Police abuses in this era were feared 
for their own sake, irrespective of their potential to produce wrongful 
convictions.6  
The criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s largely 
constitutionalized the scheme of police regulation developed as state courts 
responded to police excesses created, exacerbated, and highlighted by 
Prohibition. Mapp v. Ohio, which required states to exclude unlawfully 
obtained evidence, was justified in light of state adoptions of the exclusionary 
rule, most of which occurred during Prohibition.7 Miranda v. Arizona traced 
its origins to the findings of the Wickersham Commission Report, a 
Prohibition Era re-telling of decades-old interrogation abuses.8  Whatever 
merits Miranda may have as the primary mechanism of screening 
confessions, ensuring reliability is not one of them.9 
Neither the recent spate of DNA exonerations, 10  nor scientific 
 
52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 246, 250 (1961) (observing that “most of the 
states that accepted the ‘Weeks Rule’ did so during the period of national prohibition”).  
4 See Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence:  A 
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 100 (1986) 
(describing Wickersham Commission as first successful effort to reform police interrogators); 
Franklin E. Zimring, The Accidental Crime Commission:  Its Legacy and Lessons, 96 MARQ. 
L. REV. 995, 997 (2013) (observing that the focus of the Wickersham Commission was 
Prohibition). 
5 MARILYNN JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK 
CITY 125 (2003) (“Public alarm over [third-degree tactics] in the Progressive Era . . . proved 
fleeting and ineffective. In the 1920s, however, public debate over the third degree reemerged 
with a vengeance.”). 
6 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr. et al., The Third Degree: Report to the National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement, in NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT, NO. 11, REP. ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 154–55 (1931).  
7 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961); see also Allen, supra note 3. 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). 
9 See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody 
for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 910 n.97 (1997) (“That the Miranda Court’s 
reference to the reliability value was confined largely to a footnote referring to the possibility 
of false confessions . . . reveals that the Court was concerned with some Fifth Amendment 
values beyond the reliability of confessions.”).  
10 See Sabra Thomas, Comment, Addressing Wrongful Convictions: An Examination of 
Texas’s New Junk Science Writ and Other Measures for Protecting the Innocent, 52 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1037, 1038 & n.3 (2015) (observing that DNA has led to the exoneration of 325 people 
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discoveries about the problem of false confessions,11 nor incorrect witness 
identifications,12 have galvanized society to revamp the regulation of police 
in the way that Prohibition did.13 As a result, the regime designed to guard 
against over-zealous police continues to define the contours of constitutional 
criminal procedure. Police brutality in the search for evidence is not a major 
concern in modern society, while police contamination of confessions and 
identifications has been shown to lead to wrongful convictions. 14  Our 
patchwork rules of constitutional criminal procedure thus remain 
backwards.15 They over-deter the collection of reliable evidence and under-
deter the fabrication of false evidence. 
Criminal procedure doctrines are being questioned as reliability is 
becoming an increasingly important basis for admitting or excluding 
challenged evidence. State courts and legislatures have gradually shown 
 
in the United States as of January 2015 and suggesting that the rate of exonerations shows no 
sign of decreasing).  
11 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2010) (observing that false confessions were 
“present in 15–20% of all DNA exonerations”). 
12 See Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An 
Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 1, 1 (2015) (observing that 75% of the first 250 DNA exonerations involved mistaken 
eyewitness identifications).  
13 Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence 
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133 (2008) (calling 
for new vision of criminal procedure in light of recent exonerations); cf. DAVID A. HARRIS, 
FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 57–77 (2012) (arguing that 
police departments have played a role in the resistance to scientific developments). 
14 Society’s relative concerns about even the search for evidence does not map onto the 
way in which the Supreme Court chooses to regulate—and not regulate—search and seizures. 
See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (describing results of an empirical study 
on how relatively invasive society regards government intrusion).  Obviously, police brutality 
claims presently occupy a very high profile, but those cases do not involve searches for 
evidence. As the Supreme Court recognized in Terry v. Ohio, constitutional criminal procedure 
does little to prevent police misconduct that is not designed to obtain evidence, as the 
exclusionary rule is the primary remedy for police misconduct. 392 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1968); see 
also William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 
446 (1995) (“The vast majority of the many rules that govern how police deal with suspects 
do not concern the level of force the police apply. Rather, these rules govern what police can 
see or hear.”).  
15 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) (“[J]udicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment 
are infamous for their byzantine patchwork of protections.”).  
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greater concern about reliability in eyewitness identification,16 while federal 
courts are increasingly unwilling to exclude reliable but illegally obtained 
evidence.17 Yet, there has been no substantial effort to overhaul or overrule 
the basic framework of constitutional criminal procedure.18 Instead, courts 
have identified circumstances, which have not been previously considered 
and are unrelated to the reliability of the evidence, in which evidence 
otherwise inadmissible under Warren Court doctrines may be admitted.19 
Understanding that our scheme of criminal procedure has its origins in 
Prohibition—a quirky period in America’s past—should make courts more 
willing to overhaul criminal procedure in ways that are at least no less 
sensitive to the risks of wrongful conviction than they are to risk of improper 
searches. 
Part I of this article lays the foundation for the historical claim, 
illustrating the role Prohibition played in creating and prompting widespread 
acceptance of a rule excluding reliable but illegally obtained physical 
evidence to deter improper searches. Part II then demonstrates how the 
Prohibition-created fear of investigatory police practices reoriented rules on 
confessions to exclude statements because of police misconduct rather than 
concerns about the reliability of improperly obtained confessions. Finally, 
Part III describes the efforts of the Supreme Court to cabin, but not 
 
16 See Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An 
Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. 
REV. 759, 801–02 & n.300 (2013) (describing statutes in Illinois, Montana, and North Carolina 
identifying lack of reliability as a basis for excluding evidence and calling on courts in those 
states and elsewhere to screen confessions for lack of reliability); Jules Epstein, Irreparable 
Misidentifications and Reliability: Reassessing the Threshold for Admissibility of Eyewitness 
Identification, 58 VILL. L. REV. 69, 78–81 (2013) (discussing state court decisions making it 
more difficult for prosecution to admit identifications from suggestive lineups).  
17 See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and Burden of Proof, 3 
VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 98–103 (2015) (describing the Roberts Court expansion of the Fourth 
Amendment good faith exception).  
18 See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (“[T]he Burger and Rehnquist Courts fundamentally reworked 
constitutional criminal procedure through a gradual yet highly effective process of limiting 
and chipping away at, and occasionally overruling, Warren-era precedents.”).  
19 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504 (1996). Steiker explains:  
While the Court has left relatively intact its instruction to police officers about proper police 
practices (conduct rules), it has changed radically the consequences of violating those instructions 
(decision rules). While the Court did not purport to overrule the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule, just as it declined to overturn Miranda or Massiah, the Court nevertheless promulgated a 
series of what I call “inclusionary rules.”   
Id. 
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fundamentally overhaul, this politically unpopular scheme of police 
regulation, leaving largely unregulated the process of eyewitness 
identifications. 
I. PROHIBITION LED TO ACCEPTANCE OF EXCLUSION OF RELIABLE 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
The bulk of any course on investigatory criminal procedure involves 
limits on searches for, and to a lesser extent seizures of, tangible and 
intangible evidence.20 Courts have created more doctrines regulating police 
tactics designed to uncover and obtain physical evidence and recordings than 
they have for any other techniques of law enforcement.21 And, of course, this 
evidence is almost always quite reliable.22  Unless planted, the marijuana 
found in a defendant’s pocket in all likelihood belongs to him; the 
conversation intercepted on a wiretap is unlikely to falsely incriminate the 
parties. The extensive limitations on the ability of police to obtain reliable 
evidence are a relic of Prohibition. 
The existence of a vast body of law governing searches and seizures is 
not surprising. The exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of illegally 
obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions, has given a host of litigants, for 
almost a century, an incentive to require judges to define the parameters of 
legitimate searches and seizures.23 The existence of the exclusionary rule is 
 
20 A look at any of the leading casebooks on criminal procedure illustrates this point. See, 
e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2016) 
(discussing the Fourth Amendment doctrine for 436 of 624 pages); JOSHUA DRESSLER & 
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (5th 
ed. 2013) (investigatory doctrines relate to Fourth Amendment issues for 403 of 683 pages).  
21 See Russell D. Covey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1867–68 
(2005) (arguing that the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment should be extended to 
interrogations as the Fourth Amendment provides greater protections). 
22 See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Attorney General 
on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
573, 610 (1989) (“The exclusionary rule excludes the most reliable evidence  
. . . .”).    
23 Those criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, holding that 
evidence seized consistent with existing precedent is admissible, argue that without an 
incentive to litigate Fourth Amendment issues, litigants will not bring new issues, and when 
they do, courts will not be able to rule for defendants; thus Fourth Amendment doctrines will 
not further develop. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth 
Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and 
Davis v. United States, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 253 (2011) (“Davis v. United 
States wrestle[s] with the tension between the development of Fourth Amendment law and the 
availability of Fourth Amendment remedies.”). 
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the surprising part. The tradeoff the rule makes between reliability in criminal 
trials and deterring police misconduct is so radical—and such a breach from 
history—that one would expect that a substantial change in circumstances 
would have been required to create it. Yet the connection between the 
exclusionary rule and Prohibition has been largely overlooked. 
The rule was roundly rejected prior to Prohibition as undermining the 
reliability of trials.24 The country’s split personality on Prohibition meant that 
many would have liked to see the bootlegger—and certainly the bootlegger’s 
customer—go free.25 Even more were willing to let the bootlegger go free to 
deter police from engaging in the aggressive searches for alcohol that have 
come to be iconic images from the Roaring ‘20s.26 
The full history of the exclusionary rule—and therefore the depth of the 
connection between Prohibition and the rule—is not well known, as most 
scholars assume the United States Supreme Court created the rule in Boyd v. 
United States in 1886. 27  A willingness to sacrifice reliability to deter 
 
24 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 786–87 (1994) (citing examples of nineteenth century judges rejecting that the 
admissibility of evidence turns on the method of its seizure).  
25 See J. ANNE FUNDERBURG, BOOTLEGGERS AND BEER BARONS OF THE PROHIBITION ERA 
163 (2014) (observing that many Philadelphia-area magistrates objected to Prohibition and the 
search and seizure efforts required to enforce it).  
26 Id. (observing that some Philadelphia area magistrates objected to the efforts to enforce 
Prohibition but not necessarily to Prohibition itself); cf. Frederic A. Johnson, Some 
Constitutional Aspects of Prohibition Enforcement, 97 CENT. L.J. 113, 122 (1924) (observing, 
and lamenting, that enforcement of Prohibition could not occur without effectively repealing 
the Fourth Amendment).  
27 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). United States Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart, writing in one of the country’s leading scholarly publications, is among those to 
ignore the development of the exclusionary rule in state cases prior to Boyd. Potter Stewart, 
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983) 
(“[T]he first case associated with the development of the exclusionary rule is Boyd v. United 
States.”); see also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 n.9 (1975) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (describing Boyd as origin of exclusionary rule); TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 3 (2012) (“Boyd v. United 
States and Weeks v. United States [] established the foundation for what would become the 
rule that individuals were entitled to keep illegally acquired evidence out of criminal 
proceedings.”); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 107 (1937) (“The first [Fourth 
Amendment] case of real importance was decided in 1886. This was Boyd v. United States, 
one of the leading cases on the subject of search and seizure, a case which did much to chart 
the subsequent course of federal law.”); Amar, supra note 24, at 787 (describing Boyd as the 
case that allowed the exclusionary rule to “creep” into American law); William J. Stuntz, 
Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017–18 
7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER 11/29/2016 2:12 PM 
1000 OLIVER [Vol. 105 
unlawful liquor searches, however, pre-dated the period of National 
Prohibition by many decades and was prompted by state-level alcohol laws.28 
In the mid-nineteenth century, states throughout the Northeast and Midwest 
adopted versions of Prohibition.29 Fears of unlawful liquor searches under 
these laws led a number of these states to adopt a version of the exclusionary 
rule limited to unlawful alcohol searches.30 
Liquor prosecutions under these laws were initiated when complainants 
alleged that alcohol could be found in a particular place and at least one 
complainant described the reason for believing the alcohol could be 
discovered in this location.31 In a world of only a few nascent metropolitan 
 
(1995) (“Boyd . . . laid the foundation for modern search and seizure and self-incrimination 
doctrine.”). But see TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45 
(1969) (“The exclusionary rule for unlawfully obtained evidence made its appearance in Iowa 
in 1903, and was adopted for the federal judiciary by the Supreme Court decision in the Weeks 
case in 1914.”). 
28 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV. 
377, 399–419 (2011) [hereinafter Oliver, Modern History]; Wesley M. Oliver, Portland, 
Prohibition, and Probable Cause: Maine’s Role in Shaping Modern Criminal Procedure, 23 
ME. B.J. 210, 214–17 (2008). 
29 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, BLACKWOOD’S EDINBURGH MAGAZINE 211 (1867) 
(identifying the 13 states to adopt Prohibition in the mid-nineteenth century); see also Paul 
Aaron & David Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in America: A Historical Overview, in 
ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 141 (Mark H. Moore & 
Dean R. Gerstein eds., 1981). Prohibition did not extend to the southeast in the nineteenth 
century because of the linkage between the Temperance Movement and the Abolition 
Movement, though Prohibition nearly succeeded in parts of the antebellum South, such as 
Kentucky. See Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., “Moral Suasion Has Its Day”: From Temperance to 
Prohibition in Antebellum Kentucky, in A MYTHIC LAND APART: REASSESSING SOUTHERNERS 
AND THEIR HISTORY 19–42 (John David Smith & Thomas H. Appleton, Jr. eds., 1997). 
Ironically, Prohibition then found some of its strongest support in the south in the early 
twentieth century as the Ku Klux Klan, with its strongest (though not exclusive) support in the 
southeast, strongly supported Prohibition. KATHLEEN DROWNE, SPIRITS OF DEFIANCE: 
NATIONAL PROHIBITION AND JAZZ AGE LITERATURE, 1920–1933, at 20 (2005); Kris Durocher 
& Amy Louise Wood, Ku Klux Klan, Second (1915–1944), in 24 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOUTHERN CULTURE 228–29 (Thomas C. Holt & Laurie B. Green eds., 2013). 
30 See State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228, 230 (1854) (arresting conviction as complaint 
authorizing search for alcohol was found to be inadequate since it failed to describe basis of 
complainant’s belief of location of liquor); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. 1, 6 (1 Gray 1) (1854) 
(discussing action to recover value of liquor seized on the basis of improper complaint, which 
was analogous to modern search warrant); People v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289, 330 (N.Y. 
Gen. Term 1855) (Strong, J.) (“The complaint [analogous to the modern affidavit in support 
of a search warrant] is a substitute for an indictment . . . and requires at least as much 
particularity.”); State v. Twenty-Five Packages of Liquor, 38 Vt. 387, 390–92 (1866) 
(recognizing that action to forfeit liquor could be quashed when search warrant in 
insufficiently particular).  
31 There was some variation in the requirements for warrants in various states during the 
7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER 11/29/2016 2:12 PM 
2015] PROHIBITION'S LINGERING IMPACT 1001 
police forces, the enforcement of these laws fell on private citizens, the most 
zealous possible enforcers of state prohibitory laws.32 Beyond concerns about 
the new laws—and the searches that would be necessary to make them 
effective—the objectivity of these witnesses raised serious concerns.33 
Appellate courts responded by developing a mechanism to limit over-
reaching by these aggressive volunteer agents.34 Judgments of conviction 
were set aside when complainants failed to adequately describe a basis for 
believing alcohol could be located in the place searched. These courts 
regarded the entire prosecution to be a nullity, because the complaint, the 
charging instrument, was invalid.35 Though this mechanism was limited to 
liquor cases, and limited to cases involving bad complaints (what modern 
lawyers would describe as invalid warrant applications), 36  this mid-
nineteenth century innovation was undeniably an early version of the 
 
mid-nineteenth century version of Prohibition. Some states required more than one 
complainant, but many obviously did not. Not all states required the complainant to describe 
the reasons for his belief that alcohol could be found in a particular location. The practice of 
permitting a complainant to assert his belief that alcohol could be found in a particular location 
continued in some places through National Prohibition in the 1920s, when such a basis for a 
search warrant for liquor was struck down in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). 
Many states, however, began to require, for the first time in ordinary criminal cases, 
complainants to provide magistrates a basis for their suspicions. See Oliver, Modern History, 
supra note 28, at 403–08 (describing development of requirement that a complainant provide 
a basis for his suspicions in nation’s first prohibitory law in Maine). This was actually quite 
an innovation in search and seizure law, which had previously merely required a complainant 
to allege that he believed evidence of a crime could be discovered in a particular place. Fabio 
Arcila and I examined form books and actual warrant applications from the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century to arrive at this conclusion. See id.; Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the 
Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable 
Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 40 (2007) (observing that “justices of the peace presented 
with search warrant applications easily could have concluded that they did not have an 
absolute duty to engage in probable cause sentryship.”); Oliver, Modern History, supra note 
28, at 378 (“Probable cause was essentially a pleading requirement. . . .”). But see Thomas Y. 
Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal and 
Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” is 
Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 78 n.122 (2010) 
(relying on magistrate’s manuals to conclude that magistrates required affiants to provide the 
basis of their reasoning).  
32 See FRANK L. BYRNE, PROPHET OF PROHIBITION: NEAL DOW AND HIS CRUSADE 39 
(1961).  
33 Id. at 42.  
34 See Oliver, Modern History, supra note 28, at 410–11. 
35 Id.  
36 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled in 1873 that a judgment of conviction would 
not be arrested if an officer seized liquor without a complaint. State v. McCann, 61 Me. 116, 
118 (1873).  
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exclusionary rule. Courts were refusing to permit prosecutions for liquor 
possession to proceed because of the unlawful manner in which the 
contraband alcohol was seized. 
Contemporaneous with the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, 
most states enacted provisions complementing the federal ban on alcohol.37 
As states attempted to enforce these new laws, state courts began anew to 
embrace a rule that prevented a conviction when the police employed 
unlawful means to search for alcohol.38 The early twentieth century versions 
of the exclusionary rule in the states, consistent with the federal rule and 
unlike their nineteenth century predecessors, were not specific to liquor 
enforcement.39 
Certainly federal courts, first with the opinion in Boyd v. United States40 
and then more clearly in Weeks v. United States,41 fashioned a version of the 
exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions prior to Prohibition that was not 
limited to liquor cases. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States made clear 
that this version of the federal exclusionary rule was not merely a generic 
version of the state rules in liquor cases ordering the return of property.42 
Silverthorne not only required the improperly seized property to be returned 
but also barred the use of the information learned from improperly seized 
documents.43 This version of the exclusionary rule was not just limited to 
liquor cases or the remedy of replevin, as almost all of the pre-Prohibition 
state rules had been. Before Prohibition, then, the federal courts had gone far 
beyond the state court decisions in liquor cases and created a rule greatly 
resembling the rule applicable in modern courts. State courts, however, did 
not embrace this version of the rule until Prohibition. 
Even at the turn of the twentieth century, well prior to incorporation of 
the guarantees in the U.S. Constitution against state encroachment,44 it would 
 
37 See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24–25 
(2006). 
38 See Allen, supra note 3, at 250.   
39 Id.  
40 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
41 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding the illegally seized papers must 
be returned to defendant and may not be used in his trial).  
42 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
43 Id. at 391. 
44 See Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The 
View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 397–99 (2005) (describing the period of 
incorporation from 1932 to 1969). The United States Supreme Court’s first effort to exert 
supervision of any sort over state court proceedings appears to have occurred in United States 
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seem hard to argue that precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court had little 
relevance. The reality was, however, that federal decisions had little impact 
on the American criminal justice system at that time. The FBI was not created 
until 1908. 45  Federal proceedings even today constitute only a small 
percentage of the total number of criminal prosecutions in this country,46 but 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal criminal 
docket was negligible. 47  Federal procedures, while providing persuasive 
insights on how states might administer their criminal justice systems, were 
applied so infrequently as to barely be detectable. Prior to the Weeks decision, 
it was often claimed that only one state adopted a generic version of the 
exclusionary rule—Iowa in 1903,48 almost twenty years after Boyd and a 
decade before Weeks.49 Almost immediately after efforts began to enforce 
Prohibition, however, states began to adopt the exclusionary rule. 
  Prohibition awakened Americans to threat of unlawful searches and 
seizures. Prohibition prompted officers to conduct searches that much of 
society found offensive.50  An Assistant United States Attorney handling 
liquor cases in New York City observed in 1923: 
 
v. Shipp, in which the Court, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
ordered a retrial of a defendant who received a sham of a trial in state court, and ordered the 
defendant transferred to federal custody for his protection pending trial. 214 U.S. 386 (1909). 
In Shipp, the Court held the sheriff in contempt for failing to protect the defendant from a 
lynch mob. Id. at 386–87. For an incredible description of the extraordinary facts of the case, 
see MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999), which should be 
required reading for admission to any bar in this country.  
45 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE FBI: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1908–2008 (2011). 
46 Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 643, 675–79 (1997) (observing that while state prosecutions are far more common than 
federal prosecutions, the likelihood of conviction, and the penalty, in federal court is 
considerably higher).  
47 Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm 
or “Crying Wolf?”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1322–30 (2000) (describing history of federal 
regulation of crime). Learned Hand, then a United States District Judge in Manhattan, opposed 
Prohibition because it flooded federal courts, turning them into low-level criminal courts. See 
MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 85–86 (2007).  
48 State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903). Interestingly, though, the Sheridan opinion 
reads much like the nineteenth century liquor cases that arrested a judgment of conviction and 
returned illegally seized alcohol to the victim of the illegal search. The Iowa Supreme Court 
reasoned in Sheridan that “parties will be restored to the rights and positions they possessed 
before they were deprived thereof by . . . fraud, violence, or abuse of legal process.” Id. at 731.  
49 See Allen, supra note 3, at 249–50.  Sarah A. Seo, The Fourth Amendment, Cars, and 
Freedom in Twentieth Century America 103 (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Univ. 2016). 
50 See, e.g., John Barker Waite, Evidence—Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 
MICH. L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1944) (describing destruction of bars once alcohol was found).  
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For a time after the Volstead Act went into effect . . . few persons, even among lawyers, 
conceived the idea of questioning any Federal Government agent’s right to search for 
and seize contraband liquor as he felt inclined or as his suspicions directed. The agents 
themselves, and many of their superiors, felt secure in their right to do so as 
Government officials.51 
The Wickersham Commission observed in 1931 that Prohibition had 
gotten off to a “bad start” in part because: 
High-handed methods, shootings and killings, even where justified, alienated 
thoughtful citizens, believers in law and order. Unfortunate public expressions by 
advocates of the law, approving killings and promiscuous shootings and lawless raids 
and seizures and deprecating the constitutional guarantees involved, aggravated this 
effort. Pressure for lawless enforcement, encouragement of bad methods and agencies 
of obtaining evidence, and crude methods of investigation and seizures on the part of 
incompetent or badly chosen agents started a current of adverse opinion in many parts 
of the land.52 
The relationship between the new federal and state liquor laws, their 
enforcement, and the adoption of the exclusionary rule has been grossly 
understated. Zechariah Chafee in 1922 attributed the adoption of the 
exclusionary rule in the states to “the effect of the Supreme Court decisions 
[in Boyd, Weeks, and Silverthorne] . . . beginning to be felt.”53 John Henry 
Wigmore, perhaps the most vocal critic of the exclusionary rule, objected in 
principle to the exclusion of reliable evidence as undermining the truth-
seeking function of a court to deter police misconduct. 54  Wigmore’s 
Prohibition-era rants against the exclusionary rule did not observe that the 
public had become outraged by a rash of police misconduct in the search for 
alcohol, nor did his post-Prohibition objections to the exclusionary rule 
contend that the misconduct prompting the rule’s widespread-adoption no 
longer existed. 55  Finally, the Wickersham Commission’s broad-reaching 
consideration of the criminal justice system, a study prompted by the effect 
Prohibition had on law enforcement, did not weigh in at all on the fact, or 
 
51 Victor House, Search and Seizure Limits Under the Prohibition Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 1923, at X14.  
52  NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 722, at 45, 
46 (1931).  
53 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919–1922, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 696 
(1922).  
54 See John Henry Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches and Seizures, 
8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922).  
55 See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184 (2d ed. 1923); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184 (rev. 1961).  
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wisdom of the exclusionary rule.56 
Nevertheless, the primary role Prohibition had in making the 
exclusionary rule the primary method of police regulation cannot be denied. 
The majority of states to adopt the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio 
did so during Prohibition,57 and did so in cases involving violations of their 
state’s prohibitory laws.58 In fact, only two of the states that adopted and 
maintained the exclusionary rule during Prohibition did so in cases that did 
not involve violations of liquor laws.59 
The role of Prohibition may best be illustrated by the exclusionary rule’s 
history in New York State. In 1903, the New York Court of Appeals stated 
in People v. Adams, as many other state courts had, that the manner in which 
evidence was obtained did not affect its admissibility.60 Nevertheless, a flurry 
 
56 See Records of the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. 
57 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1960) (listing state court cases adopting 
exclusionary rule); see Allen, supra note 3.  
58 See Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922) (alcohol seized in restaurant); State v. 
Arregui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927) (bare-bones accusation of liquor sale in a search warrant 
application is insufficient); People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (Ill. 1924) (officers, in search for 
liquor, exceeded scope authorized by warrant); Flum v. State, 141 N.E. 353 (Ind. 1923) (still 
discovered on property broadly described in warrant); Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 
860 (Ky. 1920) (search of home for liquor without warrant); People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 
557 (Mich. 1919) (search of home for liquor without warrant); Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 
(Miss. 1922) (search of home for liquor without warrant); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 (Mo. 
1924) (search of person for liquor without suspicion); State ex rel. King v. Dist. Ct. of Fourth 
Judicial Dist. Missoula Cty., 224 P. 862 (Mont. 1924) (search of buildings inadequately 
described in warrant); Gore v. State, 218 P. 545 (Okla. Crim.  App. 1923) (mere belief that 
alcohol can be found at the location in question found insufficient to justify a warrant); State 
v. Gooder, 234 N.W. 610 (S.D. 1930) (mere belief that alcohol was at the scene); Hughes v. 
State, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. 1922) (recognizing in case involving seizure of alcohol post-arrest, 
that illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash. 
1922) (search of automobile for liquor unlawful); State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261 (W. Va. 1922) 
(dependent was arrested without cause and had alcohol on him); Hoyer v. State, 193 N.W. 89 
(Wis. 1923) (search of a car without probable cause yielded five bottles of liquor).  
Interestingly, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute creating the exclusionary rule after the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the exclusionary rule in a liquor case. Robert O. 
Dawson, State-Created Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure: A Study of the Texas 
Experience, 59 TEX. L. REV. 191, 195–98 (1981).  
59 See State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958 (Or. 1922) (sabotage case); State v. George, 231 P. 683 
(Wyo. 1924) (larceny case). New York, much like many northern states, had adopted a liquor-
specific mechanism functioning much like the modern exclusionary rule in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  
60 People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (N.Y. 1903) (“[T]he court, when engaged in trying 
a criminal cause, will not take notice of the manner in which witnesses have possessed 
themselves of papers or other articles of personal property which are material and properly 
offered in evidence.”). 
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of trial and appellate court opinions during Prohibition began to exclude 
evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police conduct.61 Of course, Judge 
Cardozo in 1926, which would seem to be the height of Prohibition, famously 
rejected the exclusionary rule. Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of 
Appeals, quite memorably wrote that the criminal should not go free because 
the constable blundered.62 
New York had a reputation for being a fairly progressive jurisdiction 
and Benjamin Cardozo similarly had a reputation as being a fairly 
progressive judge. Cardozo’s rejection of the exclusionary rule therefore 
often has served as a compelling argument for opponents of the rule. The 
history of Prohibition in New York, however, explains why Cardozo would 
not have had the same concerns as many other judges of his era. After the 
election of Al Smith as Governor of New York in 1922, New York repealed 
its prohibitory law, meaning that officers were no longer searching for 
alcohol.63 New York courts followed Adams until Prohibition when trial and 
appellate courts began to embrace the exclusionary rule, but by the time the 
New York Court of Appeals was called upon to re-consider the exclusionary 
rule in 1926, Prohibition had effectively ended in the Empire State, even 
though the federal effort at Prohibition would continue until 1933. 
With Mapp in 1961, the Supreme Court required the strong minority of 
states that had not yet adopted the exclusionary rule to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence to deter unlawful searches and seizures and preserve the 
integrity of the judiciary.64 Remarkably, one of the Court’s arguments for 
imposing this requirement on the states was the trend of state courts to 
embrace the rule.65 Prohibition thus not only prompted a number of states to 
 
61 See, e.g., People v. Kinney, 185 N.Y.S. 645 (Crim. Ct. 1920) (ordering return of 
defendant’s revolver discovered in a search of his home for opium on the basis of an invalid 
warrant); State v. One Hudson Cabriolet Auto., 190 N.Y.S. 481, 481–82 (Saratoga Cty. Ct. 
1921) (returning alcohol seized and dismissing action for unlawful alcohol possession); People 
v. 738 Bottles of Intoxicating Liq., 116 Misc. 252, 257 (Saratoga Cty. Ct. 1921) (holding that 
dismissal and return of alcohol is the appropriate remedy for unlawfully seized alcohol); 
People v. Jakira, 193 N.Y.S. 306 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922) (seizure of pistol in residence without 
warrant required suppression); In re Search Warrant to Search & Seize Intoxicating Liqs., 190 
N.Y.S. 574 (Orange Cty. Ct. 1921) (search of address other than one listed in warrant required 
suppression of evidence discovered).  
62 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926). 
63 Post, supra note 37, at 32–33 (discussing Al Smith’s view that the states were not 
required to assist the federal prohibitory effort); Comment, Enforcement of the 18th 
Amendment in the Absence of State Legislation, 36 YALE L.J. 260, 260 (1926) (observing New 
York’s repeal of the Mullan-Gage Act).  
64 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961).  
65 Id. at 651–52, 660. 
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adopt the rule, but played the largest role in the Supreme Court imposing this 
rule on states long after the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. 
Even though he failed to recognize the social circumstances prompting 
the creation of the exclusionary rule, Dean Wigmore’s description of the rule 
was undeniably correct—reliable evidence is sacrificed to deter misconduct. 
Courts in the past few decades have been more sensitive to the loss of reliable 
evidence.66 The limits of the Fourth Amendment have increasingly shrunk 
since the early 1970s as categories of exceptions have been carved to the 
exclusionary rule.67 More recently, the Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts have expanded good faith rules to prevent the exclusion of reliable 
evidence. 68  Nevertheless, the rules governing searches and seizures for 
reliable evidence remain more complex and restrictive than constitutional 
rules governing either interrogations or identification procedures, each of 
which pose significant risks for false conviction.69 
II. THIRD DEGREE FEARS OF THE ROARING ‘20S TAKE FOCUS OFF 
RELIABILITY 
The public’s keen awareness of police lawlessness during the era of 
Prohibition reoriented the focus of American law on confessions from 
reliability to deterrence. Up until the Prohibition Era, confessions obtained 
by improper methods were excluded because the methods were believed to 
 
66 Laurence Naughton, Taking Back Our Streets: Attempts in the 104th Congress to 
Reform the Exclusionary Rule, 38 B.C. L. REV. 205, 220 (1996) (“In recent years . . . the 
Supreme Court has determined with increasing frequency that the cost of excluding reliable 
evidence outweighs the deterrent effect that suppression would produce.”). 
67 See Smith, supra note 18, at 1060 (describing the chipping away of Fourth Amendment 
protections); Steiker, supra note 19, at 2500 (describing the Court’s presentation of Warren 
Court doctrines but limiting their reach). 
68 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011) (describing and criticizing Supreme Court’s 
decision finding that good faith record-keeping errors by police will not require exclusion); 
Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
463, 484–89 (2009) (same); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 
786–87 (2009) (same). The Supreme Court and lower federal courts are very rapidly 
expanding the good faith exception. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) 
(incorrect interpretation of traffic law by officer will not yield suppression); see also United 
States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding police officers reasonably relied on 
precedent allowing warrantless tracking by crude beepers to assume that warrantless GPS 
tracking was acceptable). 
69 See Stuntz, supra note 14. 
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risk false confessions.70 Third-degree methods became a concern for the first 
time during Prohibition despite the much older lineage of these abuses.71 
Understandably, courts wanted to deter torture, whether it created a risk of 
producing or produced false confessions, but Prohibition has left us with a 
scheme of regulating confessions that under-appreciates reliability 
concerns.72 The very real possibility of false confessions, revealed by recent 
exonerations, shows that the constitutional scheme regulating confessions 
leaves something to be desired.73 
The Supreme Court has, from its first interrogation cases, assumed the 
Due Process Clause requires that a confession satisfy the common law 
voluntariness test. Voluntariness is, and has always been, a term of art. 
Because it is impossible to read minds, there is certainly no way to know 
when a statement has been involuntarily extracted—or, what it would mean 
to involuntarily extract a confession. The Supreme Court has recognized that, 
in some sense, all confessions are involuntary in that they are prompted by 
an official request for a statement from a suspect. 74  Until Prohibition, 
however, courts considering the voluntariness of a statement looked at factors 
the court believed to bear on the statement’s reliability. In a time when false 
confessions were not studied as they are today, surely there was often 
considerable guesswork involved, but confessions were nevertheless 
excluded because of fears that they would falsely incriminate the accused. As 
Prohibition created a fear of police excesses, the voluntariness test was re-
 
70 See Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 309, 323–25, 331 (1998) (observing that pre-1936 cases were based on reliability 
though claiming Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), was not a departure from 
reliability in the Supreme Court); cf. Leo et al., supra note 2, at 492–93 (contending that Bram 
was also motivated by reliability concerns).  
71 Widespread third-degree tactics are widely believed to have begun in the United States 
in the late-nineteenth century. See Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of 
Psychological Interrogation in the United States, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND 
ENTRAPMENT 52 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); see also TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, A 
PICKPOCKET’S TALE: THE UNDERWORLD OF NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 249–52 (2006) 
(describing career of Inspector Thomas J. Byrnes, who is widely credited with bringing routine 
uses of the third degree to the New York Police Department).  
72 Well before Miranda, the voluntariness test did not contemplate the reliability of a 
confession, nor does it in the post-Miranda world. See Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary 
Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2014–20 (1998) (observing that interrogation 
law is concerned with conduct of the officers, not the reliability of the confession).  
73 See Leo et al., supra note 2, at 499 (objecting to lack of reliability in the consideration 
of admissibility of confessions). 
74 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); see also Joseph D. Grano, 
Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979). 
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conceptualized to prevent police conduct in interrogation rooms that overbear 
the will of the suspect. 
Historically, though, voluntary was a synonym for reliable. American 
cases typically trace the origins of the voluntariness rule to the English case 
of Regina v. Warickshall (1783), a case that actually deals with the admission 
of evidence gathered as a result of an unlawfully obtained confession, rather 
than the admissibility of a confession itself. Jane Warickshall confessed to 
receiving stolen property after receiving “promises of favour,” and the details 
of that confession led to the discovery of the stolen property “between the 
sackings of her bed.”75 The court rejected the idea that confessions obtained 
through trickery or threats should be excluded to discourage interrogators 
from making threats or offering promises.76 The fruits of the confession were 
admissible, the court reasoned, because once the property was located, the 
accuracy of the confession was no longer in doubt. However, statements 
obtained by threats or promises were not necessarily reliable and thus, the 
court reasoned, inadmissible: 
A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is 
presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt. . . . [B]ut a confession forced from 
the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a 
shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be 
given to it; and therefore it is rejected.77 
The court reasoned that the discovery of the stolen goods hidden in 
Warickshall’s bed was an incriminating fact whose evidentiary value did not 
depend on whether the confession was true or false.78 If confessions were 
excluded to deter the use of threats or promises in interrogations, then there 
would certainly be some value to excluding the fruits of improperly induced 
statements. 
 When the Supreme Court held in Bram v. United States in 1897 that due 
process required a confession to be voluntary, reliability would remain at 
least one of the reasons. 79  Though the Court also raised a concern that 
confessions should not be obtained at the cost of sacrificing individual 
autonomy, the Court continued to view the voluntariness rule as preventing 
 
75 The King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 234; 1 Leach 263, 263. 
76 Id. (describing as a “mistaken notion” the view that such confessions are “to be rejected 
from a regard to public faith”).  
77 Id. at 235. 
78 Id.  
79 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); see Leo et al., supra note 2, at 492–93 
(observing that the Court grounded the basis for excluding the statement “in both the idea of 
reliability and the idea of individual freedom”). 
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the consideration of false confessions. 80  To prevent this risk, the Court 
continued to embrace the very restrictive view on interrogation tactics that 
had appeared in Warickshall and a number of treatises before and after 
Warickshall: “A confession . . . whether made upon an official examination 
or in discourse with private persons, which is obtained from a defendant, 
either by the flattery of hope, or by the impressions of fear, however slightly 
the emotions may be implanted, . . . is not admissible evidence.”81 
As the Supreme Court’s first meaningful foray into confessions law, 
Bram v. United States can hardly be ignored.82 But Bram is a puzzling case. 
The officer’s promise, if it can be so construed, hardly seemed to threaten the 
statement’s reliability or implicate a concern other than accuracy. The Court, 
however, ignored a very real threat of physical violence against the suspect, 
a threat that was increasingly becoming a routine part of police 
interrogations, and focused on the vaguest of promises for confessing. 83 
Warickshall’s very strict prohibition on threats and promises thus co-existed 
with routine torture in interrogation rooms, a dichotomy one can see even in 
the Bram opinion itself. 
Bram, the first mate on a ship, was accused of murdering the ship’s 
captain, the captain’s wife, and the second mate with an ax.84 The crew, 
having reason to suspect Bram and another member of the crew, placed them 
both in irons until the ship reached Halifax, Nova Scotia, where they were 
 
80 See Leo et al., supra note 2, at 492–93. 
81 Bram, 168 U.S. at 547. 
82 The Court had previously considered the issue of voluntariness in Hopt v. Utah, which 
observed in a quite cursory fashion that there was no evidence contradicting the lower courts’ 
finding that a statement was voluntary. 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). Interestingly, the Court 
observed in Hopt that “the rule against [a confession’s] admissibility has been sometimes 
carried too far; in its application justice and common sense have too frequently been sacrificed 
at the shrine of mercy.” Id. Three years later, the Court’s opinion in Bram would provide 
perhaps the high-water mark of the type of mercy the Court decried. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, 
Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying 
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 477 (2005) (“Many slight pressures 
applied by the police to a suspect that would have been considered unconstitutional under 
Bram’s highly protective standard would now be considered permissible as being insufficient 
to overbear the will of most suspects.”). 
83 See Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. 
REV. 447, 454–56 (1938) (objecting to statements produced by “unlicensed barbarity of the 
practice, which is almost a routine in some parts of the country, of torturing prisoners to extort 
confessions,” but arguing that statements produced by promises should be excluded only if 
untrustworthy).  
84 Bram, 168 U.S. at 535–36. 
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separately interrogated by local authorities.85 Before any questioning began, 
the detective interrogating Bram began to strip him naked.86 As odd as this 
procedure may seem to modern readers, the meaning of the act was likely not 
lost on Bram.87 Lashing was a common punishment, both on the high seas 
and in American jails during the nineteenth century.88 Victims were stripped 
of their clothing to make the punishment more painful and humiliating. 
Further, third-degree interrogation tactics were widely practiced, and were 
known to be widely practiced by the late nineteenth century. Bram had to 
believe that he was about to be whipped when the detective began his 
questioning.89 
It was not, however, the implicit threat of torture that the Supreme Court 
found objectionable in Bram, it was the hope of benefit that the detective held 
out with his questions. During the interrogation, he stated, “If you had an 
accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime 
on your own shoulders.”90 This appeal to the defendant’s conscience was 
sufficient to render the confession inadmissible, and was the only part of the 
events surrounding the interrogation that the Court found worthy of 
mentioning in its voluntariness analysis. 
Conceding that, closely analyzed, the benefit which the conversation suggested was 
that of the removal from the conscience of the prisoner of the merely moral weight 
resulting from concealment, and therefore would not be an inducement, we are to 
consider the import of the conversation not from a mere abstract point of view, but by 
the light of the impression that it was calculated to produce on the mind of the accused, 
situated as he was at the time the conversation took place. Thus viewed, the weight to 
be removed by speaking naturally imported a suggestion of some benefit as to the crime 
 
85 Id. at 561. 
86 Id. at 561–62.  
87 Id. at 563–64.  
88 See, e.g., MARK E. KANN, PUNISHMENT, PRISONS, AND PATRIARCHY: LIBERTY AND 
POWER IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 158 (2005) (“Penal reformers and officials who 
approved of the use of the whip to discipline prisoners defended it against charges of cruelty, 
barbarism, and injustice by portraying it as normal, moral, and effective. Well into the 
nineteenth century, whipping was a ubiquitous punishment administered by parents to 
children, teachers to students, and officers to sailors and soldiers.”); Art. V—Report of the 
Massachusetts State Prison (Documents of the Senate, January, 1846. No. 3.), 2 PA. J. PRISON 
DISCIPLINE & PHILANTHROPY 183, 185–93 (1846) (describing debate over whether lashings 
ought to be abandoned in prisons). 
89 See Murphy v. United States, 285 F. 801, 812–13 (7th Cir. 1923) (concluding that 
Bram’s confession was involuntary, not because of an implied promise of a benefit, but 
because stripping Bram was an implicit threat of flogging). 
90 Bram, 168 U.S. at 564. 
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and its punishment as arising from making a statement.91 
Bram quickly became perhaps the most irrelevant Supreme Court case 
in the history of American criminal justice—announcing a rule too restrictive 
of police questioning to be followed and completely out of touch with even 
the realities of contemporary police practices implicated by its facts.92 Bram 
would also provide state courts a basis for treating police violence as 
something other than a threat or promise. Such a decision could not have 
come at a worse time, as third-degree tactics were just starting to become 
commonplace in American police stations at the time Bram was decided. 
While examples of torture-induced confessions are as old as confessions 
themselves, the systematic use of torture as a regular feature of American 
police interrogation is widely believed to have commenced in the late 
1800s.93 While there were concerns raised about police brutality, especially 
in the early years of the New York Police Department, the public ultimately 
looked the other way as Progressives like New York Police Commissioner 
Teddy Roosevelt argued that a police force, free of corruption, could be 
trusted to use physical violence against the right people. 94  Police, 
Progressives argued, could been trusted to identify guilty suspects and abuse 
them with locust clubs on the street. Progressive reformers were less explicit 
about their support for violence in interrogation rooms, though their 
advocacy of police violence against the criminal element on the street was 
quite explicit. 
In state courts, where most interrogation practices were being 
considered, judges looked the other way, even when there was substantial 
evidence that police were torturing suspects. When there was a question 
about whether a confession was voluntarily given—which often meant 
whenever officers denied torture—state courts generally let the jury hear the 
statement, but informed the jury that it was to disregard it if involuntarily 
obtained.95 
 
91 Id. at 564-65. 
92 OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 25 (1973) 
(“[T]he elaborate development of standards governing the admissibility of confessions in state 
courts followed a course altogether different from that suggested by the Bram decision.”). 
93 See Leo, supra note 71, at 52. 
94 JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 90–91, 124–25 (describing Roosevelt’s view of police 
violence and observing that while incidents of police torture were known in the Progressive 
Era, efforts at reform during this period “proved fleeting and ineffective”). Judge William J. 
Gaynor criticized Progressive reformers for their belief that society could “be reformed and 
made better . . . instead of being debased . . . by the policeman’s club and axe.” William J. 
Gaynor, Lawlessness of the Police in New York, 176 N. AM. REV. 10, 25 (1903). 
95 See Indian Fred v. State, 282 P. 930, 934 (Ariz. 1929) (“In most jurisdictions, if there is 
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Torture during this period went from being the most forbidden 
interrogation technique to the most permitted. Some mid- to late-nineteenth 
century courts had imposed greater sanctions on statements extracted by 
actual physical violence than statements extracted by the “flattery of hope, or 
by the torture of fear.”96 Even though Warickshall and its extensive progeny 
permitted the admission of physical evidence obtained as a result of an 
involuntary confession, at least two courts held that physical fruits of a 
tortured confession were inadmissible, even though the physical fruits were, 
unlike a bare statement, unquestionably reliable.97 By the early twentieth 
century, physical violence was less a reason to exclude a confession than a 
promise of leniency. As the New York Court of Appeals stated in People v. 
Trybus in 1916: 
The question is not . . . whether the detective struck defendant or held him illegally in 
custody. Neither of these facts, per se, makes the reception of the statements in evidence 
illegal as a matter of law, although they are properly to be considered by the jury in 
determining the voluntariness of the statements.98 
In Trybus, a private detective had been permitted to unlawfully detain a 
suspect in the Buffalo jail, where he initially visited physical violence on his 
prisoner and obtained a statement from him that he and Buffalo detectives 
swore “was obtained without threats or promises.”99 In addition to the assault 
and illegal detention, Trybus contended that he was promised leniency in 
exchange for his confession, which the officers denied. The New York Court 
of Appeals concluded that the question of the statement’s voluntariness had 
appropriately been left to the jury because, “[a]side from the rough handling 
and the illegal custody, which are not denied, there is no uncontradicted 
 
a conflict of evidence on the question, and the court is not satisfied that the confession is 
voluntary, it should submit it to the jury with instructions to disregard it if upon all the evidence 
they believe it to be involuntary.”); see generally H. Rockwell, Annotation, Voluntariness of 
Confession Admitted by Court as Question for Jury, 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933) (describing cases 
in which voluntariness is a question for the jury). 
96 The King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 235; 1 Leach 263, 264.  
97 See Rusher v. State, 21 S.E. 593, 594 (Ga. 1894) (“The fruits of physical torture, as 
distinguished from mere fear, it would seem, ought to be unavailing. The honor and decency 
of the law would seem to be involved in rejecting them. The law ought to hold out no 
encouragement to violent and lawless men to commit crime for the sake of detecting a previous 
crime, and bringing the offender to punishment.”); Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382, 386 (1856) 
(“[I]f it appeared that the confession had been extorted by violence, [the law] also protects [the 
defendant] against testimony which could only be discovered, or made available through the 
instrumentality of such confession.”).  
98 People v. Trybus, 113 N.E. 538, 540 (N.Y. 1916) (citation omitted). 
99 Id. at 539. 
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evidence of threats or promises.” 100  Uncontradicted claims of physical 
violence, combined with illegal custody, were thus not enough to prevent a 
jury from hearing the confession, though uncontradicted evidence of a threat 
or a promise apparently would have been sufficient. 
Courts thus gave the green light to outrageous police conduct in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even those readers generally aware 
of the existence of third-degree tactics are apt to be disturbed by the extent 
of official torture in the history of American law enforcement. Those rightly 
shocked by the in-court admissions of Mississippi deputies who obtained 
tortured confessions in the seminal case of Brown v. Mississippi,101 may be 
surprised to learn that this degree of candor was not isolated. Wisconsin 
officers, for instance, similarly boasted of beating a confession out of a 
suspect in 1920, leaving marks so telling that a physician testified that the 
suspect “must have suffered extremely.”102 One of the officers in that case, 
when asked if he had beaten the suspect, responded “what we ought to have 
done would be to kill him.”103 Semi-official interrogation devices were not 
limited to the iconic rubber hoses.104 At least two police departments built 
versions of the electric chair to be used in interrogations, delivering painful 
but less-than-lethal amperage.105 
The tolerance of such extraordinary force—some of the specifics of 
which were undeniably kept from the public—depended on enormous trust 
in police officers to correctly identify guilty suspects.106 Prohibition eroded 
the public’s confidence in law enforcement. Prohibition demonstrated that 
corruption was intractable and that even honest enforcement was a thing to 
be feared. It destroyed the faith Americans had developed in burgeoning 
police forces and called into question the legitimacy of their tactics.107 
 
100 Id. at 540. 
101 Asked during the trial how severely he had beaten one of the suspects in that case, the 
deputy sheriff answered, “Not too much for a negro.” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 
(1936); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
375 (1993).  
102 Lang v. State, 189 N.W. 558, 560 (Wis. 1922).  
103 Id. 
104 There were certainly a number of documented uses of rubber hoses. See Note, The 
Third Degree, 43 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618–19 (1930); Rowe v. State, 123 So. 523 (Fla. 1929); 
People v. Sweeney, 136 N.E. 687 (Ill. 1922).  
105 The Third Degree, supra note 104, at 619. 
106 I have laid out this argument in much more detail in Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The 
Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 483–515 
(2010).  
107 Id.   
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This loss of faith in police shifted the focus of interrogation law from 
the possibility of a false confession to a concern about brutality itself, 
regardless of whether the resulting confession was reliable. Newspapers, 
books, and even films by the 1930s detailed the horrors of police 
interrogations.108 In New York City, juries began to acquit defendants in 
cases involving police interrogation with sufficient frequency to prompt even 
trial judges supportive of the Progressive view of police violence to call for 
investigations of interrogation methods.109 Jurors did not share the judiciary’s 
faith in the reliability of tortured confessions and, with repeated public 
accounts of police misconduct inside and outside interrogation rooms, 
increasingly did not believe officers’ claims that they had not assaulted 
suspects. Acquittals in cases involving confessions became quite common. 
Legal reformers began to insist that courts more stringently supervise 
interrogations. Without looking into individual cases, the traditionally 
conservative New York Bar Association called on courts to more carefully 
scrutinize confessions and not allow juries to determine the voluntariness of 
confessions if there was evidence supporting a claim of brutality. Courts in 
New York and beyond began to adopt this position.110 
Reliability was no longer the sole focus of regulating interrogations—
reliability became a secondary concern. The frequency of torture and, 
perhaps more importantly, the perception of the frequency of torture in 
interrogation rooms that led to acquittals, needed to be reduced to restore the 
public’s confidence in confessions and in police practices generally. The 
practice of routine police torture, once thoroughly exposed, was itself rightly 
seen as something to be condemned and deterred, even if the evidence 
obtained through these methods was eminently reliable. The Wickersham 
Commission’s report on interrogations in 1931—itself prompted by 
President Hoover’s call for an evaluation of the enforcement of Prohibition—
concluded that third-degree practices risked unreliable confessions but 
described the violent method of interrogation as “shocking in its character 
and extent, violative of American traditions and institutions, and not to be 
tolerated.”111 
Coercive tactics thus came to be seen as problematic for their own sake. 
Irrespective of the reliability of the confessions they produced, courts began 
to exclude the fruits of improper interrogations at the same time that the 
 
108 RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 44 (2008). 
109 JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 129–31. 
110 Id. at 124–28. 
111 Chafee, Jr. et al., supra note 6, at 155.  
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exclusionary rule was gaining popularity as a method to influence police 
practices.112 Judicial regulation of confessions on a basis other than reliability 
was hardly a stretch at this point in history. Excluding the fruits of improper 
searches only achieved the goal of fewer improper searches; excluding the 
fruits of improperly conducted interrogations deterred potentially unreliable 
confessions. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, a doctrine regulating the exclusionary rule 
provided the vehicle for decoupling reliability from confessions law in the 
Supreme Court shortly after Prohibition. With the decision in Nardone v. 
United States, the Court recognized the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, 
excluding evidence discovered as a result of information unlawfully learned, 
unless the latter discovery was “so attenuated [from the illegal conduct] as to 
dissipate the taint.”113 In Nardone, the government sought to use evidence 
discovered as a result of an unlawful wiretap, not the words actually 
intercepted by the wiretap. The Court concluded that derivative use of 
unlawfully obtained evidence would undermine the deterrent rationale of the 
exclusionary rule. “To forbid the direct use of [illegally obtained evidence] 
but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods 
deemed ‘inconsistent with ethical standard and destructive of personal 
liberty,’” the Court reasoned. 114  Famed evidence professor Charles 
McCormick suggested a year before the Nardone decision that the same sort 
of deterrent justified excluding the fruits of tortured confessions.115 
 
112 Academic commentators, for the first time during Prohibition, began to advocate use 
of the exclusionary rule to deter unreasonable searches and seizures. See Thomas E. Atkinson, 
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. 
L. REV. 11, 24–25 (1925). To the extent academic commentators commented on pre-
Prohibition expressions of the rule, they either merely described the new rule or were quite 
critical.  See JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188–89 (1913); WIGMORE, 
supra note 55; Wigmore, supra note 54. Of course, the United States Supreme Court had 
adopted a clear version of the rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and had 
stated a version of the rule that did not depend on the deterrence rationale in Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Early versions of the rule, that seemingly had to rest on a 
deterrence rationale, appeared in state court decisions as early as the mid-1800s. See discussion 
supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.  
113 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  
114 Id. at 340. Nardone involved a case of wiretapping contrary to the prohibition of the 
1934 Communication Act, which, unlike the present federal wiretapping rule, did not itself 
contain a provision excluding evidence. For an excellent description of the background of 
Nardone, see Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality 
of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (2008).  
115 See McCormick, supra note 83, at 454–55 (“Certainly the right to be immune in one’s 
person from the secret violence of the police seems to be even more deserving of judicial 
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The courts and the legislatures increasingly have come to believe that a 
privilege to have the fruits of such a search or seizure suppressed as evidence 
is needed to discourage the practice. The reason for extending to the person 
from whom a confession has been wrung by torture, a similar privilege, 
whether the confession be true or false, is even stronger.116 
The Supreme Court would soon apply the deterrent rationale from 
Nardone to unlawfully obtained confessions. Just as the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine required exclusion of the unlawfully obtained physical evidence 
as well as evidence obtained as a result of the illegally discovered evidence, 
subsequent voluntary confessions as well as physical evidence were to be 
excluded when the product of an involuntary confession.117 If reliability was 
the sole basis for determining voluntariness, subsequent confessions, and 
certainly physical fruits of the confessions, would be admissible unless there 
were reasons to suspect the reliability of these pieces of evidence.118 Courts 
and commentators recognized that reliability was being augmented by a goal 
of deterring police excesses in interrogation rooms. 119  McCormick, who 
appears part insightful commentator and part prophet when viewed in the lens 
 
protection than the immunity from searches and seizures. The courts and legislatures have 
increasingly come to believe that a privilege to have the fruits of such a search or seizure 
suppressed as evidence, is needed as a discourager of the practice.  The reason for extending 
to the person from whom a confession has been wrung by torture, a similar privilege, whether 
the confession be true or false, is even stronger.  Such policy as modern writers are able to 
discover as a basis for the self-incrimination privilege—and it is feeble and inadequate at 
best—pales to a flicker beside the flaming demands of justice and humanity for protection 
against extorted confessions.”).  
116 McCormick, supra note 83, at 454–55. 
117 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (subsequent statement); United States v. 
Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947) (dictum) (suggesting that physical fruits of an involuntary 
confession might be excluded under principle announced in Nardone); Leyra v. Denno, 347 
U.S. 556 (1954) (subsequent statement); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) 
(recognizing that unlawfully obtained statement and its fruits should be excluded); see also 
Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled 
Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 939 (1995) (“As the voluntariness test continued to evolve 
in the middle part of the twentieth century, the results reached by the Court seemed to reflect 
less a concern with the reliability of a particular confession than disapproval of police 
interrogation tactics considered offensive or subject to serious abuse.”). Lower courts into the 
1950s continued to admit the physical fruits of involuntarily obtained statements. Id. at 937–
39. Of course, the Supreme Court currently recognizes as hornbook law the exclusion of 
“involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent 
criminal trial.” United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004).  
118 See, e.g., Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (admitting 
statement after previous involuntary statement would “defeat the exclusionary rule”). 
119 See Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and 
Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 665 (1966).  
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of history, observed in 1938: 
Can we not best understand the entire course of decisions in this field as an application 
to confessions both of a privilege against illegally obtained evidence—a privilege more 
clearly emerging in the decisions as the courts more clearly perceive the hidden 
iniquities of torture—and of an overlapping rule of incompetency which excludes the 
confession when untrustworthy?120 
Concerns about interrogation methods would then prevail as the sole 
justification for excluding a confession as involuntary. In 1960, the Supreme 
Court announced in Rogers v. Richmond that the reliability of a confession 
played no role in evaluating its admissibility.121 Rejecting the trial court’s 
legal standard that “took into account the circumstances of probable truth or 
falsity,” the Court held: 
The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for the purposes of the Federal 
Constitution, on the question of whether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement 
officials was such as to overbear [the suspect’s] will to resist and bring about 
confessions not freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete 
disregard of whether or not [the suspect] in fact spoke the truth.122 
If reliability played no part in the voluntariness analysis, then even 
completely unreliable statements could be admitted if there was no police 
misconduct. This next logical step was taken in Colorado v. Connelly.123 
Connelly, who was mentally ill and reported hearing voices, approached a 
Denver police officer and told the officer he had committed a murder and 
wanted to talk about it.124 The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were 
reasons to conclude that Connelly’s statement was not reliable, but concluded 
concerns about reliability did not provide a basis for concluding that the 
statement was involuntary. The Court concluded even if the circumstances 
under which a confession was given suggested that the statement was “quite 
unreliable,” state or federal rules of evidence, not the Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution, governed its admissibility.125 
Most often, however, courts inquiring into the voluntariness of a 
confession addressed factors that are related to a statement’s reliability. The 
defendant’s age, education and intellectual capacity, and experience dealing 
 
120 See McCormick, supra note 83, at 457. 
121 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
122 Id. at 543–44. See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of 
the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent 
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.”). 
123 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).  
124 Id. at 157. 
125 Id. at 166–67.  
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with the police all bear on whether he is likely to falsely incriminate himself 
in the face of police questioning.126 Under the voluntariness test, the less 
sophisticated the suspect, the more likely his statement is to be deemed 
involuntary.127 
The voluntariness test, however, did not survive as the primary means 
of regulating confessions. Frustrated with its own efforts, and the efforts of 
lower courts, to identify and apply factors in the voluntariness test, the Court 
in Miranda v. Arizona turned to a waiver approach.128 Miranda, designed to 
prevent involuntary statements, asks only whether the suspect has been 
informed of his or her rights and has waived those rights. So long as the 
suspect has the intellectual capacity to comprehend the warnings and has 
waived them, the Miranda inquiry goes no further.129 
If the voluntariness test continued to be justified by a concern about 
reliable confessions, Miranda could hardly be regarded as protecting it. 
Practically, Miranda even turns the twentieth century voluntariness 
considerations on their head. Those who are most willing to assert their rights 
are not likely to be the poorly educated, low-functioning suspects who lack 
experience with the criminal justice system—those who assert their rights are 
likely to be just the opposite. Miranda confers yet another of the law’s 
advantages on sophisticated players. Other things being equal, the more 
educated, more sophisticated, and wealthier members of society are more 
likely to invoke their right to the assistance of counsel. Those who have the 
means to imagine engaging an attorney, and certainly those who have 
attorneys on retainer can more easily envision the process of consulting with 
counsel.130 
 
126 See Steven Drizin & Richard Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in a Post-DNA 
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (observing that the young and mentally ill were overly 
represented in a sample of false confessors).  Earl Washington’s confession provides an 
example of circumstances in which adherence to many of the factors considered in the 
voluntariness analysis, if seriously considered, would have prevented the admission of a false 
confession. See Paul T. Hourihan, Note, Earl Washington’s Confession: Mental Retardation 
and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1495–1501 (1995).  
127 See White, supra note 72, at 2028 n.171. 
128 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1966) (observing that the voluntariness 
test risked overlooking a confession that was voluntary). An interesting recent commentary 
suggests that because of the substantial limitations the United States Supreme Court has placed 
on Miranda, voluntariness may once again be the primary method of confession regulation. 
Eva Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness 
Test, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2015).  
129 But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (noting that age can be 
considered in determining whether Miranda waiver was valid).  
130 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1985), is one of the few interpretations of Miranda 
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Sophistication, however, is not always about class or wealth in the 
criminal justice system. Sometimes it is about experience. Repeat players—
recidivists—have street-smarts. They have experience in dealing with 
attorneys, have learned the advantages of invoking their rights to silence and 
counsel, and are not as intimidated by the criminal process as first-time 
arrestees. These are the suspects who are most likely to invoke their rights to 
silence and counsel. Miranda is not just rewarding past wrongs, it is stacking 
the deck against reliability. Those with prior records are statistically more 
likely to be guilty of crime than those with no criminal records.131 Other 
things being equal, Miranda has the effect of giving a right to silence that is 
more likely to be exercised by guilty suspects than innocent ones.132 This 
seeming irony is possible only because Miranda is aimed at guarding against 
an involuntary confession, not an unreliable one. 
This state of affairs would be bad enough if Miranda merely 
supplemented the post-Prohibition version of the voluntariness test, which 
does not formally recognize reliability as a goal. But Miranda went further. 
As the Supreme Court has often noted, it is very difficult to demonstrate that 
a statement is involuntary if there is a valid Miranda waiver.133 Miranda has 
 
that does not privilege the more sophisticated.  A person who has the means to have a lawyer 
on retainer may not have that lawyer invoke his warnings for him, placing those with and 
without lawyers on retainer on an equal footing. But many of the interpretations of Miranda 
further the elitist protection of Miranda, such as the requirement that a suspect clearly invoke 
his rights to silence and counsel. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (right to 
counsel); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (right to silence). Heartier, more 
sophisticated suspects are more likely to speak with the sort of clarity required to invoke these 
protections.  
131 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (recognizing probative 
value of prior bad acts, but also recognizing evidentiary rule excluding them because they risk 
“confusion of the issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice”). 
132 See George C. Thomas, III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 39 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2007) (noting that “[i]nnocent suspects, probably more than 
guilty ones” resist invoking counsel). 
133 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (“[G]iving the warnings and getting 
a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement 
is involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires 
unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid 
waiver.”); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (observing that Miranda 
provides some clarity for officers and that claims of involuntariness are rare once there is a 
valid waiver); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a 
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ 
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are 
rare.”); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1523 
(2008) (“[I]t turns out that following Miranda’s hollow ritual often forecloses a searching 
inquiry into the voluntariness of a statement.”). 
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thus replaced voluntariness’ totality of the circumstances test that considered 
human frailties with a single-factor waiver standard that privileges the 
heartiest members of society—and the most likely guilty. Not only does 
Miranda do nothing to exclude unreliable confessions, it displaced a rule that 
indirectly considered factors that bore on reliability. 
Recent cases of wrongful convictions have demonstrated, contrary to 
the supposition of many, 134  that false confessions do occur. 135  Factors 
suggesting false confessions have been identified from these exonerations 
and from statements given to police that subsequent investigation revealed to 
be false. The leading nature of the questioning, officers’ suggestions that 
there is incontrovertible evidence of guilt such as scientific evidence, lack of 
knowledge by the suspect of non-public facts about the crime, and police use 
of trickery are indicators of a potentially false confession. 136  Practices 
compromising a confession’s reliability do not, however, undermine the 
statement’s admissibility under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
voluntariness rule.137  State and federal rules of evidence exclude statements 
with indicia of unreliability only if a court finds the risk of prejudice from the 
statement substantially outweighs its probative value—a very difficult 
standard to satisfy.138 
Some interrogation methods are producing false confessions. 139  
 
134 See Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 
433 (2012) (“[F]alse confession is not a phenomenon that is known to the average layperson 
as a matter of common sense.”). 
135 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 126. 
136 See J.P. Blair, The Roles of Interrogation, Perception, and Individual Differences in 
Producing Compliant False Confessions, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 173, 183–84 (2007) 
(noting that confrontation with false evidence is a common factor in false confessions); 
Frances Chapman, Coerced Internalized False Confessions and Police Interrogations: The 
Power of Coercion, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 159, 176, 191–92 (2013) (identifying factors 
tending to produce false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe, Coerced Confessions: The Logic of 
Seemingly Irrational Action, 6 CULTIC STUD. J. 1 (1989) (explaining common features of false 
confessions). 
137 See Leo et al., supra note 16, at 778 (“Perversely, the constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure do not allow a trial judge to suppress confession evidence at trial on the grounds 
that it is false and unreliable. Worse still, the constitutional law of criminal procedure provides 
no doctrinal mechanism for either recognizing or suppressing contaminated and formatted 
false confessions.”).   
138 Id. at 794–98; see also Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: 
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 810–15 (1997) (criticizing then-current 
law that permitted lying to suspects).  
139 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 920–21 (2004) (“[T]he research literature has established 
that [false] confessions occur with alarming frequency.”). 
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Miranda says nothing about the officer’s ability, post-waiver, to falsely 
inform a suspect that others have implicated him, to erroneously tell the 
suspect that forensic science has revealed his guilt, or to provide the suspect 
with sufficient details of the crime so that his confession has the ring of 
reliability.  The substance of interrogations is largely unregulated.  Police can 
lie to suspects and even present them with false evidence, though some courts 
exclude confessions when officers present suspects with false forensic 
reports.140  
Prohibition both created search and seizure issues and prompted limits 
on searches and seizures. Brutal interrogation practices preceded the 
Eighteenth Amendment by decades. Prohibition did, however, acutely arouse 
concern about third-degree practices. The laudable desire to end such 
practices, irrespective of the accuracy of their results, refocused American 
confessions law in a way that would not account for twenty-first century 
interrogation practices that risk false confessions. 
III. EFFORTS TO CABIN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE LEAVE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATIONS UNDER-REGULATED 
The Prohibition Era’s most prominent rule certainly has not been 
uncontroversial, and judicial efforts to retreat from it have left a hodgepodge 
of police regulation. The exclusionary rule is justified by the incentives it 
creates for officers to follow rules of constitutional criminal procedure as 
they obtain evidence. When the evidence officers obtain may also be 
unreliable because of the means used to obtain it, the justification for the 
exclusionary rule would seem especially strong. While some degree of 
concern about eyewitness identification is long-standing, relatively new 
scientific research has demonstrated the severity of the problem with this 
method of proof.141 By the time the Supreme Court considered whether the 
 
140 Thomas, supra note 132, at 1308–10. An awful example of a court’s refusal to consider 
the potential impact of lying to a suspect about forensic evidence can be seen in State v. Cope, 
748 S.E.2d 194 (S.C. 2013) (falsely reporting results of forensic test did not render statement 
inadmissible). 
141  In 1927, Felix Frankfurter observed that “[t]he identification of strangers is 
proverbially untrustworthy [and the] hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable 
number of instances in the records of English and American trials.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE 
CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1962). Nevertheless, it is clear that jurors tend to trust 
eyewitness testimony when they should not. See Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert 
Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93, 95 (1992). In the 
last thirty years, scientists have taken a keen interest in the problem of eyewitness 
identification. In the 1970s, only four articles contained the words “eyewitness” and 
“identification” in the abstract, while more than two thousand studies were done of eyewitness 
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exclusionary rule should apply to the fruits of improper identification 
procedures, the Court’s view of the exclusionary rule had shifted 
substantially.142 The lack of regulation of eyewitness interrogation appears to 
be a function of the Court’s discomfort with the rule that excluded reliable 
evidence and a respect for stare decisis that made the Court unwilling to 
overrule or overhaul the rule. In the 1970s, the Court was quick to cabin the 
exclusionary rule in ways that did not directly contradict prior cases to 
maximize the admissibility of evidence.143 
Manson v. Brathwaite, the seminal case on eyewitness identifications, 
was decided during this period of frustration with the exclusionary rule.144 
Nowell Brathwaite’s attorney quite understandably argued that the jury in the 
defendant’s prosecution for selling heroin should not have heard testimony 
describing how a Connecticut State Trooper identified him. 145  Trooper 
Jimmy Glover, acting undercover, went to an apartment in Hartford where he 
purchased two glassine bags of heroin from a man he had never met.146 
Afterwards, he drove from the apartment to police headquarters and 
described the man, later believed to be Brathwaite, to Officer D’Onofrio from 
the Hartford Police Department. D’Onofrio thought he recognized the person 
Trooper Glover described. 147  Apparently the department had previously 
suspected Brathwaite of wrongdoing because Officer D’Onofrio was able to 
provide Trooper Glover with a picture of Brathwaite already in the 
department’s possession.148 No explanation was given for having Trooper 
Glover identify the suspect from a single photo rather than from an array of 
photos or a lineup of live persons. 
Prior to its consideration of Brathwaite’s claim, the Supreme Court had 
recognized that asking an eyewitness to confirm the identity of a single 
 
testimony in the past three decades. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
142 That the Supreme Court would back away from a degree and type of regulation that 
was designed for the Prohibition Era is quite consistent with what Orin Kerr describes as an 
equilibrium-adjustment theory of the Fourth Amendment. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 480–81 
(arguing that “when new technology or social practice makes evidence substantially harder for 
the government to obtain” the Court relaxes Fourth Amendment protections; when evidence 
becomes easier to obtain, the Court makes the Fourth Amendment requirements more 
stringent). For a criticism of this view of the Fourth Amendment, see Christopher Slobogin, 
An Original Take on Originalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 14 (2011).  
143 See Steiker, supra note 19, at 2507.  
144 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
145 Id. at 101. 
146 Id. at 99–101. 
147 Id. at 101. 
148 Id.  
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person “has been widely condemned” as risking an “irreparable mistaken 
identification.”149 The Court in Stovall v. Denno recognized, however, that 
there were times when these types of admittedly suggestive identification 
procedures, though fraught with the potential for error, are the best 
identifications possible. 150  In Stovall, for instance, the only witness to a 
murder was the victim’s seriously wounded widow whose chances for 
survival were not good. 151  Due process, the Court reasoned, would not 
preclude the admission of such an identification that represented the only 
possibility for the only witness to exonerate or identify the suspect.152 Stovall 
could have been deemed to create an exigent circumstance exception to a 
prohibition on suggestive identification procedures, but the Supreme Court 
subsequently took a different path, unmooring the regulation of eyewitness 
regulation from a deterrence model. 
With its decision in Neil v. Biggers, the Court made clear that police 
procedures threatening misidentification would be less deterred than illegal 
physical searches that produced reliable evidence. In Biggers, decided five 
years before Brathwaite’s case, a rape victim had come to the police station 
seven months after her attack to identify a person who may have been her 
assailant.153 The victim had been unable to identify the attacker from previous 
lineups and photo arrays.154 Unlike in Stovall, nothing explained why the 
victim was presented with only one person to identify. No exigent 
circumstances prevented the assembly of a traditional lineup, particularly 
given that the identification occurred in a police station. The Supreme Court 
in Neil, however, admitted the evidence, finding “the identification was 
reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”155 
Notwithstanding the problematic precedent of Biggers, Nowell 
Brathwaite’s lawyer understandably argued that the fruits of a suggestive 
identification procedure should be excluded unless the prosecution could 
explain why another procedure could not have been used. There was a lot to 
commend Brathwaite’s argument. The identification in Neil had occurred 
before the Supreme Court’s criticism of suggestive lineups in Stovall and, 
more importantly, there was a very compelling ring to Brathwaite’s argument 
for deterring suggestive identification practices. The Second Circuit in this 
 
149 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).  
150 Id. at 302.  
151 Id. at 295.  
152 Id. at 302. 
153 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).  
154 Id. at 194–95. 
155 Id. at 195.  
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case reasoned that by excluding all identifications obtained through 
“unnecessarily suggested confrontation procedures” it would deter 
subsequent suggestive procedures that might be unreliable and exclude 
identifications that may be inaccurate.156 The Supreme Court had, in fact, 
used a similar argument to support the Miranda rule. The Miranda waiver 
requirement, the Court reasoned, would prevent the admission of confessions 
obtained by overbearing the suspect’s will, even though the involuntariness 
of the statement may not be apparent from the circumstances.157 
By 1977, when the Court decided Manson v. Brathwaite, however, the 
Supreme Court was not as sympathetic to the need to manage investigative 
techniques as it had been when Miranda was decided—at least not when the 
price of regulating police was the exclusion of reliable evidence. Richard 
Nixon’s presidential campaign in 1968 placed no small emphasis on the 
damage he claimed the Court had done to law enforcement interests.158 The 
Court, for reasons that are only partly attributable to Nixon’s judicial 
appointees, began to retreat from many of the broad criminal justice 
principles announced by the Warren Court.159 
The principle of stare decisis is, however, a fairly powerful one, even 
when courts fundamentally disagree with previous decisions.160 An about-
face even on very controversial decisions, perhaps especially on very 
controversial decisions, can undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary. The 
most controversial aspects of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence—Miranda and the exclusionary rule—thus remained, but the 
principles underpinning these decisions were not taken to their logical 
conclusions—and a variety of decisions limited the scope of these rules.161 
 
156 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977) (comparing the court of appeals’ 
approaches). 
157 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). 
158 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 130 n.117 
(1998) (“Richard Nixon made Miranda one of the centerpieces of his 1968 ‘law and order’ 
campaign.”); Steiker, supra note 19, at 2466 (noting that Nixon targeted “the Warren Court’s 
controversial decisions” in the area of constitutional criminal procedure and that when he won 
the presidency and quickly replaced the Chief Justice and three Associate Justices with three 
appointees of his own, “it was widely predicted that the major innovations of the Warren Court 
in constitutional criminal procedures. . . would not long survive.”). 
159 As early as 1969, the Supreme Court was attempting to cabin the scope of the 
exclusionary rule. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (recognizing standing 
limits on the exclusionary rule to preserve reliability concerns). 
160 See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era 
to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 653 (1999) (“Stare decisis is also thought to 
preserve the Court’s legitimacy.”). 
161 See Steiker, supra note 19, at 2480–85. 
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The Warren Court’s restrictions on investigative procedures had been limited 
to those concerns that had lingered since Prohibition—search and 
interrogation practices. By the time identification procedures were 
considered in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court’s willingness to use the 
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct had waned substantially—the 
momentum of Prohibition Era concerns did not extend to new concerns as 
the election of Richard Nixon changed the Court. 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Brathwaite’s deterrence-based 
rationale for excluding the identification in his case reads like a broadside 
attack on the exclusionary rule generally. While the Court recognized the 
“surprising unanimity among scholars” in favor of excluding all suggestive 
identifications, such a rule would “keep[] evidence from the jury that is 
reliable and relevant.”162 The Court, citing Brewer v. Williams and United 
States v. Janis, recognized its own changing sentiment on the exclusionary 
rule, observing that “inflexible rules of exclusion that may frustrate rather 
than promote justice have not been viewed recently by this Court with 
unlimited enthusiasm.”163 
Certainly, the Court was correct that there were decisions prior to 
Brathwaite limiting the rule that denied reliable evidence to find-finders. 
Throughout the 1970s, the Court limited the scope of the exclusionary rule, 
finding that the costs of the rule exceeded its benefits.164 The Court identified 
categories in which it concluded that the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary 
rule was outweighed by its costs, but, of course, the cost of losing convictions 
and the value of deterring misconduct are measured in very different ways.165 
In a 1969 case that would set the stage for limiting the scope of the 
exclusionary rule, the Court concluded that there was insufficient benefit to 
giving a remedy to anyone other than those whose rights had been violated:166 
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police 
have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative 
evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We 
adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of 
 
162 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1977). 
163 Id. at 113. 
164 Arnold H. Loewy, The Exclusionary Rule as a Remedy, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 369, 
370 (2014) (“The Court does attempt to assess the value of the exclusionary rule on a cost-
benefit basis, albeit . . . not very well.”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical 
Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 210–
41 (2005) (describing the efforts of the Court to rein in the exclusionary rule using a cost-
benefit analysis). 
165 Oliver, supra note 164, at 210–41. 
166 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179–80 (1969). 
7. OLIVER FINAL TO PRINTER 11/29/2016 2:12 PM 
2015] PROHIBITION'S LINGERING IMPACT 1027 
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment 
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.167 
Prior to Brathwaite, the Court used this cost-benefit analysis to reject 
the application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings,168 habeas 
corpus actions, 169  and civil tax actions. 170  Refusing to eliminate the 
exclusionary rule, the Court rejected the application of the rule to these 
circumstances not previously considered by the Court, finding that the 
deterrent benefit was not as strong when evidence was excluded in these 
proceedings as it was when the evidence was excluded from a criminal 
trial. 171  The Court’s respect for precedent, in other words, allowed the 
exclusion of reliable evidence to continue, while the Court continued to 
balance cost and benefit in circumstances not previously held to require 
exclusion. 
Timing is critical to understanding cases like Manson v. Brathwaite. The 
Court considered the constitutional limits on eyewitness identification 
procedures at the time when the Court was attempting to increase the amount 
of reliable evidence courts could hear, without disturbing the fundamental 
rule that perfectly reliable evidence could, under some circumstances, be 
excluded. As the fruits of an improperly conducted eyewitness identification 
had not previously been held subject to the exclusionary rule, Brathwaite 
offered another opportunity for an exception. In this case, the Court explained 
the exception for eyewitness identifications by observing that “[u]nlike a 
warrantless search, a suggestive pre-indictment identification procedure does 
not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest.”172 
Of course an un-Mirandized confession does not intrude on a 
constitutionally protected interest, either. Perhaps more importantly, and 
something for which the Court is criticized, it is the Court alone that defines 
which interests enjoy protection by deciding which expectations of privacy 
are reasonable. 173  Given the broad discretion the Court has allowed itself to 
 
167 Id. at 174–75. 
168 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–51 (1974). 
169 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489–95 (1976). 
170 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1976).   
171 See generally Oliver, supra note 164 (explaining Calandra, Stone, and Janis). After 
Brathwaite, the Court found that preventing illegally obtained evidence from being used on 
cross-examination yielded insufficient deterrence to justify the loss of reliability. United States 
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980). 
172  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.13 (1977). 
173 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (observing that the Court’s standard 
for privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, “whether the individual has an expectation of 
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determine which interests are protected, it would hardly be a stretch for the 
Court to conclude that the Constitution protects an individual against 
procedures that might lead to false evidence and, therefore, his wrongful 
conviction and incarceration. 
Unwilling to use the exclusionary rule to deter suggestive procedures, 
the Court concluded that “reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony.” 174  Thus, even if police use 
suggestive procedures that are highly criticized by the Supreme Court, the 
resulting identification is inadmissible only if it appears to be unreliable. To 
evaluate the reliability, courts are to look at the totality of circumstances, 
including the eyewitness’ opportunity to view the suspect, the degree of 
attention the witness paid, the accuracy of the description the witness 
provided, the witness’ level of certainty, and the length of time between the 
crime and the identification.175 
Lack of reliability is, however, not enough to exclude an eyewitness 
identification. Just as the Supreme Court recognized in the interrogation 
context, the Due Process Clause does not bar the admission of unreliable 
evidence—this is the domain of evidence law—but instead limits improper 
police behavior.176 
Thus, the Supreme Court held in Perry v. New Hampshire that the 
Constitution required no consideration of a lineup’s reliability, even if the 
circumstances of the identification were suggestive, so long the identification 
was not coordinated by police.177 In Perry, a witness to the theft of a car 
stereo was asked if she could identify the thief. She pointed out her window 
and said it was a man who happened, apparently coincidentally, to be 
standing next to an investigating officer in view of her window. Due process 
did not require an assessment of the reliability of this identification 
procedure, Justice Ginsberg concluded for the majority, because “law 
enforcement officials did not arrange the suggestive circumstances” of this 
identification.178  The defendant in Perry argued that if “reliability is the 
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony,” then 
the role police played, or didn’t play, in an unduly suggestive identification 
should be irrelevant. The Court disagreed, observing that because one aim of 
 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” has “often been criticized as 
circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable”). 
174 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).  
175 Id. at 114–16. 
176 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).   
177 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720–21 (2012). 
178 Id. at 725–26. 
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excluding improperly conducted unreliable identifications was still “to deter 
law enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the 
first place,” unless there was misconduct in the identification process, issues 
of reliability were themselves of no constitutional significance.179 
Eyewitness testimony may well be the least reliable form of evidence 
typically introduced in criminal trials.180 Courts have not ignored our new 
understandings of the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications, but 
even when they demonstrate sensitivity to the issue, they often do less to deter 
police misconduct that produces suggestive identifications than they do to 
deter unlawful acts that produce physical evidence. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has perhaps attracted the most attention of any court to consider this 
issue with its very thorough opinion, laden with references to empirical 
research on eyewitness identifications, in State v. Henderson.181 Henderson, 
however, retained the basic scheme from Brathwaite. Identification 
procedures are excluded under Henderson, and Brathwaite, only if the 
identification procedures were suggestive and the resulting identification 
lacks reliability. Henderson used a sophisticated understanding of social 
science to guide trial courts in evaluating reliability, but it did not take a 
deterrence approach to police misconduct. Henderson, like Brathwaite, does 
not exclude the fruits of even intentionally suggestive lineups, if they appear 
reliable.182 Police thus may be willing to chance a suggestive lineup before 
they would risk a questionable search. While both are appropriately deterred, 
 
179 Id. at 726.  
180 See George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State Standards for the Admission of 
Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 102 
(2011) (describing factors discovered from social science explaining “precisely why 
eyewitnesses are so often incorrect”). 
181 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). A number of law review articles 
recognized the thoroughness and groundbreaking quality of the opinion. See, e.g., Amy D. 
Trenary, State v. Henderson: A Model for Admitting Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 84 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1257 (2013); Dana Walsh, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call 
for Greater State Involvement to Ensure Fundamental Fairness, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1415, 1449–
53 (2013) (describing “New Jersey as a model” because of the Henderson case); Benjamin 
Wiener, Comment, Revisiting the Manson Test: Social Science as a Source of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 861, 862–63 (2014) (describing Henderson as the 
notable amendment to the “due process test for the admissibility of eyewitness evidence” by 
a state court); Robert Couch, Comment, A Model for Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry 
v. New Hampshire, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1535 (2013) (celebrating Henderson decision). It is 
ironic that Henderson has received the bulk of the academic attention. Two states, 
Massachusetts and New York, automatically exclude lineups that are unduly suggestive. See 
Epstein, supra note 16, at 80 (2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560 
n.3 (Mass. 2006); People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 543 (1991)).   
182 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
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only the admission of the former risks a wrongful conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The legacy of Prohibition is a system of police regulation that is 
completely backwards. Drugs found in an unlawful search of a trunk will be 
excluded even though highly probative of guilt and discovered through a 
procedure that was likely to disclose innocent behavior no more private than 
the possession of a jack and tire iron. 183  A confession containing no 
objectionable tactics, bearing no indications of unreliability, and 
corroborated by physical evidence, is excluded if police merely fail to 
provide the suspect with warnings that any American citizen with a television 
set could recite in his sleep. This sort of reliable evidence is excluded, 
according to hornbook constitutional criminal procedure, to discourage 
improper police conduct. Yet when police create suggestive lineups, or lie to 
suspects in interrogation rooms, when they engage in objectionable conduct 
that may create unreliable evidence, the deterrence rationale applicable to 
other police tactics does not require the evidence to be excluded. And as 
constitutional criminal procedure is designed to regulate police behavior, not 
ensure the reliability of evidence, a mere showing that an identification is 
unreliable, regardless of the method of the identification, is not a sufficient 
basis to exclude the identification. Yet, there is something quite bizarre about 
a system of police regulation that more carefully scrutinizes procedures that 
can only produce reliable evidence than processes that may produce false 
convictions. 
Legal developments produce a momentum that can feel almost pre-
ordained when its context is not understood. The fact that the origins of our 
unique concern about searches for reliable evidence lie in a quirky period in 
our nation’s history provides a basis for overhauling our structure of criminal 
procedure to deter in equal measure police tactics that threaten to produce 
unreliable evidence. If we are to maintain a system of constitutional criminal 
procedure that is much more cautious about admitting reliable evidence than 
potentially unreliable evidence, we ought to have a better rationale than a 
historical practice that grew out of an idiosyncratic period of American 
history. 
 
183 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 27, at 1019 (noting irony of the fact that current Fourth 
Amendment law allows police to uncover “a suspect’s finances or phone calls” but not the 
contents of a lunch bag). 
